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Abstract
We study the construction of a social ordering function for the
case of a public good nanced by contributions from the population,
and we extend the analysis of Maniquet and Sprumont (2004) to the
case when contributions cannot be negative, i.e., agents cannot receive
subsidies from others.
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1 Introduction
In an economy where a private good can be used to produce a public good,
we reconsider the problem of sharing the production cost when negative
cost shares are ruled out. This constraint is often imposed in practice; it is
unobjectionable if the private good is leisure.
Because rst-best allocations may not be achievable due to informational
or institutional constraints, a complete social ordering of all allocations is de-
sirable: maximizing such an ordering under the relevant constraints delivers
a second best solution. Following Maniquet and Sprumont (2004), we recom-
mend to use the following public good welfare maximin ordering. Consider
an allocation consisting of a level of production of the public good and a list
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of cost shares paid by the agents. The public good welfare of a given
agent at that allocation is the quantity of the public good that, consumed
for free, would leave her indi¤erent to that allocation (Moulin, 1987). The
ordering we advocate ranks allocations by applying the maximin criterion to
the distributions of public good welfare levels they generate.
Suppose that negative cost shares are allowed and consider a two-agent
allocation where agent 1s cost share x1 is positive while agent 2s cost share
x2 is negative. In the spirit of the Pigou-Dalton principle, a transfer of private
good from 2 to 1 that does not reverse the signs of their cost shares should be
regarded as a social improvement. Figure 1 shows that the public good wel-
fare maximin ordering satises this Free Lunch Aversionproperty. In the
gure, a transfer of private good from 2 to 1 increases the lowest intersection
of the indi¤erence curves with the vertical axis. Maniquet and Sprumont
(2004) proved that Free Lunch Aversion combined with two other standard
requirements known as Pareto Indi¤erence and Responsiveness force us to
use an ordering compatible with the public good welfare maximin principle.
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Figure 1
When negative cost shares are forbidden, Free Lunch Aversion does not
apply. Yet, Figure 2 shows that the public good welfare maximin ordering
satises the following local version of the axiom. In a situation where agent
1s cost share is positive while agent 2s cost share is zero, a small enough
transfer of private good from 2 to 1 is a social improvement. (Note, however,
that a transfer leaving 2s cost share smaller than 1s need not yield a better
allocation: the transfer must be smaller than  in Figure 2.). We propose
a variant of Maniquet and Sprumonts characterization of the public good
welfare maximin ordering based on this weak version of Free Lunch Aversion.
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To x ideas, we present our result for a pure public good. The straight-
forward extension to an excludable public good is briey discussed in the last
section.
2 Setup
There is a xed nite set of agents, N = f1; :::; ng; with n  2. There are two
goods: one public good and one private good. We denote by zi = (xi; y) 2 R2+
agent is consumption bundle: y is the consumption of the public good, and
xi is agent is contribution to its cost, measured in terms of the private good.
All agents consume the same quantity of the public good: exclusion is ruled
out.
A preference for agent i is a binary relation Ri over R2+ which is complete,
transitive, continuous, strictly decreasing in the private good contribution
level xi; strictly increasing in the public good level y, and convex. The
indi¤erence and strict preference relations corresponding to Ri are denoted
by Ii and Pi: The set of all preferences is denoted byR. A (preference) prole
is a list R 2 RN :
The set of admissible consumption bundles for an agent with preferences
Ri is Zi(Ri) = fzi 2 R2+ j ziRi(0; 0)g: Given a preference prole R, an (admis-
sible) allocation z = (z1; :::; zn) species an admissible consumption bundle
zi = (xi; y) 2 Zi(Ri) for each agent i 2 N . Writing z = (x; y) = (x1; :::; xn; y);
we denote the set of admissible allocations by Z(R) = f(x; y)j(xi; y) 2 Zi(Ri)
for each i 2 Ng:
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A social ordering for R is a complete and transitive binary relation de-
ned over Z(R), the set of all admissible allocations for R: A social ordering
function R assigns to each preference prole R 2 RN a social ordering R(R)
for R. Thus, zR(R)z0 means that the allocation z is at least as desirable as
z0 from a social viewpoint if the preference prole is R: Similarly, I(R) and
P(R) denote social indi¤erence and strict social preference.
3 Axioms for social ordering functions
We impose four conditions on the function R: The rst one is a weak version
of the Pareto principle.
Weak Pareto. Let R 2 RN and z; z0 2 Z(R): If ziPiz0i for all i 2 N; then
zP(R)z0:
The stronger axiom asking that zP(R)z0 if ziRiz0i for all i and ziPiz
0
i for some
i; is not satised by the public good welfare maximin function discussed in
the Introduction.
Our second condition is a well known informational simplicity requirement
due to Hansson (1973). The condition weakens Arrows binary independence:
it states that the social ranking of two allocations is insensitive to changes
in individual preferences that do not a¤ect the indi¤erence curves at those
allocations. Given a preference Ri 2 R and a consumption bundle zi 2 R2+;
let I(Ri; zi) = fz0i 2 R2+jz0iIizig denote the indi¤erence curve of Ri through
zi:
Hansson Independence. Let R;R0 2 RN and z; z0 2 Z(R) \ Z(R0): If
I(Ri; zi) = I(R
0
i; zi) and I(Ri; z
0
i) = I(R
0
i; z
0
i) for all i 2 N; then zR(R)z0 ,
zR(R0)z0:
The third condition is our central axiom. It says that a small enough
transfer of the private good from an agent paying nothing to an agent paying
a positive cost share is socially desirable. Given two agents i; j 2 N , dene
t(i; j) 2 RN by ti(i; j) = 1; tj(i; j) =  1; and tk(i; j) = 0 for all k 2 Nnfi; jg:
The vector t(i; j) represents a transfer of one unit of the private good from
j to i.
Weak Free Lunch Aversion. Let R 2 RN ; (x; y) 2 Z(R); and i; j 2 N
be such that xi = 0 and xj > 0: For all " > 0 there exists ; 0 <   "; such
that (x+t(i; j); y)R(R)(x;y):
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A slightly stronger condition would require, under the same premise, that
there exist " > 0 such that (x+t(i; j); y)R(R)(x;y) whenever 0 <   ":
Both versions are satised by the public good welfare maximin function.
Our last condition requires that social preferences be continuous.
Continuity. For all R 2 RN and z 2 Z(R); the sets fz0 2 Z(R) j z0R(R)zg
and fz0 2 Z(R) j zR(R)z0g are closed.
4 Public good welfare maximin
For each Ri 2 R and zi 2 Zi(Ri), there is a unique level of the public good
y 2 R+ such that ziIi(0; y): We may therefore dene the numerical welfare
representation function u(Ri; :) : Zi(Ri)! R+ by
u(Ri; zi) = y , ziIi(0; y):
The number u(Ri; zi) is agent is public good welfare level at bundle zi: The
public good welfare maximin (social ordering) function R is dened as fol-
lows. For any R 2 RN and z; z0 2 Z(R);
min
i2N
u(Ri; zi)  min
i2N
u(Ri; z
0
i), zR(R)z0:
Theorem 1 The public good welfare maximin function R is the only social
ordering function satisfying Weak Pareto, Hansson Independence, Weak Free
Lunch Aversion, and Continuity.
Proof. It is routine to check that R satises Weak Pareto, Hansson In-
dependence, Weak Free Lunch Aversion, and Continuity. Conversely, let R
be a social ordering function satisfying these axioms. We prove that for all
R 2 RN and z; z0 2 Z(R),
min
i2N
u(Ri; zi) > min
i2N
u(Ri; z
0
i)) zP(R)z0: (1)
Continuity then implies that
min
i2N
u(Ri; zi)  min
i2N
u(Ri; z
0
i), zR(R)z0;
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hence R = R:
To prove (1), we rely on the fact that Weak Pareto and Continuity imply
the following two properties.
Pareto Indi¤erence. Let R 2 RN and z; z0 2 Z(R): If ziIiz0i for all i 2 N;
then zI(R)z0:
Pareto. Let R 2 RN and z; z0 2 Z(R): If ziRiz0i for all i 2 N; then zR(R)z0:
LetR 2 RN and z; z0 2 Z(R) be such thatmini2N u(Ri; zi) > mini2N u(Ri; z0i):
Assume, contrary to the desired result, that
z0R(R)z: (2)
Without loss of generality, suppose mini2N u(Ri; z0i) = u(Rn; z
0
n):
Step 1. We derive from the social preference (2) a social preference between
two allocations related to z; z0 at a prole related to R. Pareto and Hansson
Independence are used repeatedly in this part of the proof. Figure 3 is
provided to illustrate the argument in the case n = 2 (to keep the notations
of the gure close to the text, one agent is called n and the other i).
Step 1.1. Let za = (xa; ya); zb = (xb; yb) 2 Z(R) be such that
(i) xai = x
b
i = 0 for all i 2 Nnn;
(ii) ziPizai ; z
b
iPiz
0
i for all i 2 N;
(iii) u(Rn; zbn) < u(Rn; z
a
n) < y
a < yb:
Dene  = yb   ya.
6
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Figure 3
Modify R to obtain a prole R0 2 RN satisfying the following conditions.
First, the indi¤erence curves at the allocations z; z0 are unchanged:
I(R0i; zi) = I(Ri; zi) and I(R
0
i; z
0
i) = I(Ri; z
0
i)
for all i 2 N: Second, the indi¤erence curves of R0n restricted to public good
levels between ya and yb + ; are parallel to the curve I(Rn; zbn) within a
small distance to the left of that curve. The purpose of this construction will
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become clear in Step 2, where we perform a sequence of private good transfers
from agent n to the others. Formally: for each (x; y) 2 R+  [ya; yb + ];
let d(x; y) be the number such that (x+ d(x; y); y) 2 I(Rn; zbn); dene Z =
f(x; y) 2 R+ [ya; yb+] j 0  d(x; y)  g, and choose  > 0 small enough
that I(Rn; zan) \ Z = ;: For all (x; y); (x0; y0) 2 Z; let
(x; y)R0n(x
0; y0), d(x; y)  d(x0; y0):
Observe that I(Rn; zan) \ Z = ; implies that zanP 0n(x; y) for all (x; y) 2 Z:
Third, the indi¤erence curves of all other preferences have a positive slope
at (0; ya): Using straightforward notation,
s(R0i; (0; y
a)) > 0
for all i 2 Nnn:
By (2) and Hansson Independence, z0R(R0)z: By Weak Pareto, zP(R0)za
and zbP(R0)z0: Since R(R0) is transitive,
zbP(R0)za: (3)
Step 1.2. Let  = mini2Nnn s(R0i; (0; y
a)) : this smallest slope is positive by
construction of R0: Choose a positive number " such that
"  minf; 
2(n  1)g
and choose
  maxf; 2(n  1)

g:
Note that ya + "  yb:
Let R00 2 RN be a prole such that R00n = R0n and the indi¤erence curves
of all other agents are unchanged at (0; ya) and (0; yb); and steep enough at
(0; yb + ") :
I(R00i ; (0; y
a)) = I(R0i; (0; y
a));
I(R00i ; (0; y
b)) = I(R0i; (0; y
b));
s(R00i ; (0; y
b + "))  
for all i 2 Nnn:
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By (3) and Hansson Independence, zbP(R00)za: Next, consider the allo-
cation zc given by zci = (0; y
b + ") for all i 2 Nnn and zcn = (xcn; yb + ")I 00nzbn.
By Pareto, zcR(R00)zb; hence
zcP(R00)za: (4)
Next, let R000 2 RN be a prole such that R000n = R00n = R0n and the
indi¤erence curves of all other agents are steep enough for levels of the public
good between ya and yb + " :
s(R000i ; (0; y))   if ya  y < ya + ";
s(R000i ; (0; y))   if ya + "  y  yb + "
for all i 2 Nnn: These requirements are consistent because   :
By (4) and Hansson Independence,
zcP(R000)za: (5)
Step 2. We use Weak Free Lunch Aversion, together with Pareto and
Continuity, to derive a contradiction to (5).
Step 2.1. Let Zc denote the set of allocations z = (x; y) 2 Z(R000) such that
(i) zR(R000)zc;
(ii) ya + "  y  yb + ";
(iii) (xi; y)R000i (0; y
a + ") for all i 2 Nnn and xi = 0 for some i 2 Nnn;
(iv) d(xn; y) 
P
i2Nnn xi + (n  1)y
b+" y

:
The set Zc is nonempty since it contains zc: It is compact by Continuity.
Let z = (x; y) 2 Zc be such that y  y for all (x; y) 2 Zc: We claim that
y = ya + ":
Suppose that y > ya+ ": By (iii), xi = 0 for at least one agent i 2 Nnn:
Applying Weak Free Lunch Aversion as many times as there are such agents,
there exists x such that
xi > 0 and (xi; y)R000i (0; y
a + ") for all i 2 Nnn; (6)P
i2N xi =
P
i2N x

i ; and (x;y
)R(R000)(x; y):
Construct (x0; y0) such that (x0i; y
0)I 000i (xi; y
) for all i 2 N and x0i = 0 for
some i 2 Nnn: Since preferences are strictly monotonic, y0 < y: We claim
that (x0; y0) 2 Zc; contradicting the denition of (x; y):
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By Pareto Indi¤erence, (x0;y0)I(R000)(x;y): It follows that (x0;y0) R(R000)
(x;y) R(R000) zc; hence (x0;y0) satises (i). In view of (6), (x0; y0) satises
(ii) and (iii). Since (x; y) 2 Zc;
d(xn; y
) 
X
i2Nnn
xi + (n  1)
yb + "  y

; (7)
and since s(R000i ; (0; y
0))   for all i 2 Nnn;X
i2Nnn
(xi   x0i)  (n  1)
y   y0

: (8)
Because the indi¤erence curves of R000n are parallel over the relevant region,
d(x0n; y
0)  d(xn; y) = xn   xn =
P
i2Nnn(xi   xi ): Combining this equality
with inequalities (7), (8),
d(x0n; y
0) = d(xn; y
) +
X
i2Nnn
(xi   xi )

X
i2Nnn
xi + (n  1)y
b + "  y


X
i2Nnn
x0i + (n  1)
yb + "  y0

;
that is, (x0; y0) satises (iv), completing the proof that (x0; y0) 2 Zc: This is
the announced contradiction; we conclude that y = ya + ":
Since y = ya + " and yb   ya = ; conditions (iii) and (iv) applied to
z = (x; y) give
xi = 0 for all i 2 Nnn and d(xn; y)  (n  1)


:
Step 2.2. Let Z denote the set of allocations z = (x; y) 2 Z(R000) such that
(i) zR(R000)z;
(ii) ya  y  ya + ";
(iii) (xi; y)R000i (0; y
a) for all i 2 Nnn and xi = 0 for some i 2 Nnn;
(iv) d(xn; y) 
P
i2Nnn xi + (n  1)( + y
a+" y

):
Again, this set is nonempty and compact. Letting z = (x; y) 2 Z
be such that y  y for all z = (x; y) 2 Z; it is straightforward to mimic
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the argument in Step 2.1 (this time, using the fact that s(R000i ; (0; y))   for
all i 2 Nnn and ya  y < ya + ") to show that y = ya:
Conditions (iii) and (iv) applied to z = (x; y) give
xi = 0 for all i 2 Nnn and d(xn ; y)  (n  1)(


+
"

):
Since   2(n 1)

and "  
2(n 1) ; we get d(x

n ; y
)  :
Recall from Step 1.1 that this implies zanP
0
nz

n ; and since R
000
n = R
0
n; we
have zanP
000
n z

n : Pareto implies
zaR(R000)z;
and, since zR(R000)zc and zR(R000)z; by transitivity, zaR(R000)zc, the an-
nounced contradiction to (5).
5 Discussion
1) The following examples show that our axioms are independent.
i) The social ordering function recommending indi¤erence between all
allocations at all preference proles satises all axioms in Section 3, except
Weak Pareto.
ii) Let L  R be the subset of linear preferences: each Ri 2 L is charac-
terized by a positive number (Ri) such that (xi; y)Ri(x0i; y
0) if and only if
y (Ri)xi  y0 (Ri)x0i: Dene R as follows. If R 2 LN and z; z0 2 Z(R);
zR(R)z0 ,
X
i2N
u(Ri; zi)
(Ri)

X
i2N
u(Ri; z
0
i)
(Ri)
:
If R 2 RNnLN and z; z0 2 Z(R); then zR(R)z0 , zR(R)z0. The function
R satises all our axioms but Hansson Independence.
iii) To construct a function R satisfying all axioms but Weak Free Lunch
Aversion, we begin with a remark. Let f : R+ ! R+ be a strictly in-
creasing function and dene, for each Ri 2 R, a welfare representation
function v(Ri; :) : Zi(Ri) ! R+ by v(Ri; zi) = f(y) , ziIi(0; y): We say
that the welfare representation procedure v is equivalent to the welfare rep-
resentation procedure u: Clearly, the social ordering function R dened
by zR(R)z0 , mini2N v(Ri; zi)  mini2N v(Ri; z0i) for all R 2 RN and
z; z0 2 Z(R) is the public good welfare maximin function R:
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To obtain the desired example, choose a continuous welfare representation
procedure v that is not equivalent to u; and apply the maximin criterion
to the welfare distributions generated by the allocations. For instance, let
v(Ri; zi) = y , ziIi(1=y; y) (i.e. v measures the vertical coordinate of the
intersection between the indi¤erence curve and the hyperbola of equation
x = 1=y); and let zR(R)z0 , mini2N v(Ri; zi)  mini2N v(Ri; z0i) for all
R 2 RN and z; z0 2 Z(R).
iv) Finally, the public good welfare leximin function (Maniquet and Spru-
mont, 2004) satises all our axioms but Continuity. That social ordering
function agrees with the maximin function whenever the latter expresses a
strict preference between two allocations. For a more radically di¤erent ex-
ample, consider the following function R: For all R 2 RN and z; z0 2 Z(R);
let zR(R)z0 if and only if either
j fi 2 N j u(Ri; zi) > 1g j > j fi 2 N j u(Ri; z0i) > 1g j
or
j fi 2 N j u(Ri; zi) > 1g j = j fi 2 N j u(Ri; z0i) > 1g j andmini2N u(Ri; zi)
 mini2N u(Ri; z0i).
2) Contrary to Maniquet and Sprumont (2004), we use Weak Pareto and
Hansson Independence instead of Pareto Indi¤erence (dened in the proof
above) and Responsiveness (which says that the relative ranking of an al-
location with respect to another is not worsened if the upper contour sets
of the agents shrink at the bundles of this allocation and expand at the
other). This di¤erence is inessential and Maniquet and Sprumonts result
holds with either combination of axioms. Hansson Independence is logically
weaker than Responsiveness, and Weak Pareto is usually considered more
intuitively compelling than Pareto Indi¤erence, although under Continuity,
Weak Pareto implies Pareto Indi¤erence as recalled in our proof.
Another slight di¤erence between the two papers is that our Weak Free
Lunch Aversion axiom only requires weak social preference whereas Mani-
quet and Sprumonts Free Lunch Aversion requires strict preference for the
post-transfer allocation. This di¤erence is connected to the other because
with an axiom requiring only weak social preference, Pareto-Indi¤erence and
Responsiveness do not permit to exclude universal indi¤erence as a possible
social preference. Maniquet and Sprumont show that Pareto Indi¤erence,
Responsiveness and Free Lunch Aversion imply Weak Pareto. With a vari-
ant of our Weak Free Lunch Aversion requiring strict preference, we can
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prove a similar result (with a similar argument, which we omit here). This
implies that with this variant of Weak Free Lunch Aversion, we could re-
place Weak Pareto and Hansson Independence by Pareto Indi¤erence and
Responsiveness and still obtain our result.
3) Finally, we provide a brief explanation of the claim made in the Intro-
duction that our result extends to the case of a public good with exclusion.
When a nonrival good is excludable, agents may consume di¤erent quantities
of the good. By Pareto Indi¤erence, and thanks to monotonicity and convex-
ity of preferences, one can always nd an equivalent allocation in which all
agents consume the same quantity of the nonrival good. Therefore, with just
this additional step, our proof shows that the public good welfare maximin
function is the only one satisfying the axioms in this extended setting, even
when the Weak Free Lunch Aversion axiom is written so as to apply only
to allocations in which all agents consume the same quantity of the nonrival
good.
6 References
Hansson, B. 1973, The independence condition in the theory of social choice,
Theory and Decision 4: 25-49.
Maniquet, F. and Sprumont, Y. 2004, Fair production and allocation of an
excludable nonrival good,Econometrica 72: 627-640.
Moulin, H. 1987, Egalitarian-equivalent cost sharing of a public good,
Econometrica 55: 963-976.
13
